Do non-financial firms react to monetary policy actions as banks do? by Carbó Valverde, Santiago & López del Paso, Rafael
 1
 




Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica 
 
Universidad de Granada 
 
 
Do non-financial firms react to monetary policy 
actions as banks do? 
 
 
Santiago Carbó Valverde & Rafael López del Paso1 
Universidad de Granada & FUNCAS 
 
 
                                                 
1 Corresponding author: Rafael López del Paso, Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de 




Abstract: The theory of the bank lending channel indicates that financial institutions with larger size, 
higher capitalisation and higher liquidity present a greater capacity to maintain their levels of credit 
supply in a situation of monetary contraction. However, there is a paucity of (European) studies that 
analyse the bank lending channel from the non-financial firms’ perspective. This paper analyzes the 
impact of monetary policy actions on a large sample of Spanish firms. The empirical evidence for 
Spain shows that the impact of size, solvency and liquidity are similar for banks and non-financial 
firms. (93 words)  
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In terms of the theoretical foundations of the bank lending channel, the existing empirical 
evidence indicates that financial institutions with greater size, a higher level of capitalisation, and a 
higher proportion of liquid assets exhibit greater capacity to maintain the level of their credit 
investments when faced with a hardening of monetary conditions, without needing to resort to other 
alternative sources of finance (Kashyap and Stein, 2000). In the case of non-financial firms, however, 
there is very limited empirical evidence, particularly en Europe. This article analyses whether the 
existing evidence for banks is similar to what non-financial firms exhibit. 
 
    According to the proposition of Modigliani and Miller (1958) –under the assumption of 
perfect markets and information – the market value of a firm is independent of its financial structure. 
Investment decisions depend only on the expected rate of return. In this context, it is indifferent to 
firms whether they use their own capital or obtain external finance in order to carry out their 
investment projects. Likewise, the distinction between bank debt and non-bank debt is not relevant, as 
the providers of both types of finance face the same conditions of supply. 
 
The empirical evidence shows that firms do not carry out their business in a world 
characterised by fulfilment of the theoretical assumptions of the perfect information model (Kashyap 
et al., 1994; Bernanke et al., 1996). In the presence of asymmetries of information, and given the non-
perfect substitutive character of the different sources of finance, firms show, within the alternatives 
available, the following order of preferences: own resources, trade credit, finance from the capital 
markets and bank credit (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990). The way in which 
this structure is materialised determines the composition of the balance sheet, as well as the external 
finance premium, borne because of the cost assumed in the valuation of the collateral offered, and the 




Given the relevance of information asymmetries in the process of credit supply (from any 
lender the firm can interact with), the theory of the balance sheet channel establishes that 
transformations in the structure of firms’ balance sheets – originated by the propagation of the 
economic cycle – may alter its capacity to capture resources and expenditure, leading to the generation 
of endogenous credit cycles (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). In this context, the financial wealth of firms 
determines their possibilities of obtaining finance, as it acts as collateral for the possible non-
repayment of the capital contributed (Gertler, 1988). The theory of the bank lending channel shows 
that the financial wealth together with the composition of the financial debt, and the structural 
financial characteristics of the firm (i.e. its level of capital and liquidity), determine the degree of 
access to bank credit, especially when the supply of credit shrinks following a tightening of monetary 
conditions (Kashyap and Stein, 1995; Stein, 1988; Kishan and Opiela, 2000). Consequently, it is 
expected that smaller firms and those with a lower level of capital will be affected to a larger extent by 
a contractive disturbance of monetary policy (Kashyap et al., 1996).  
 
Firms of larger size present less severe problems of moral risk and adverse selection, because 
of the greater transparency with which they operate. This is perceived by the markets, so that they 
have, compared to small production units, a greater capacity for debt and for replacing bank credit by 
other types of financing when official interest rates rise (Hubbard, 1998). Likewise, those firms with 
greater strength of own capital will display – in the face of restrictions in the markets where they seek 
external finance – a greater capacity to carry out their investment projects (Baccheta and Caminal, 
2000). Consequently, it is easy to observe that the operativity of the bank lending channel is similar, 
when these two criteria are taken into account, for both financial and non financial firms.  
 
A different conclusion is obtained when the analysis takes into account the level of liquidity, 
given the ambiguity of the empirical results obtained. On the one hand, there is some empirical 
evidence to confirm that the holding of liquid assets above a certain threshold limits the possibilities of 
obtaining external resources, as it decreases the possibilities of transformation of the asset portfolio, as 
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well as the net value of the firm, and therefore of the collateral that can be offered (Morellec, 2001). 
On the other hand, other studies maintain that firms with a substantial cushion of liquidity are better 
placed to grant and obtain finance from other firms in the economy, especially when there have been 
successive falls in interest rates. This last interpretation is consistent with that corresponding to 
financial intermediation (Myers and Rajan, 1998). Furthermore its fulfilment seems to confirm that 
non-financial firms respond in a similar way to financial institutions to changes in the orientation of 
monetary policy. To our knowledge, there is very little empirical evidence for Europe on the 
hypothesis that non-financial firms respond in a similar way to banks. This is a very important issue 
for the actions of policymakers, central banks, banking institutions and non-financial firms in the 
context of the European financial integration. European firms tend to rely on bank loans to larger 
extent than their US counterparts. This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature by offering 
empirical evidence in this area taking the Spanish case as reference. The choice of this country as the 
analytical framework is of special relevance fundamentally because of: 1) firms’ heavy dependence on 
bank credit for the financing of their investment projects, as well as the shallowness of the capital 
markets which limits their access for the capture of resources; 2) the considerable reduction of the 
opportunity cost of maintaining liquid assets, as a consequence of the substantial fall of interest rates 
during the period of study (1992-2002).   
 
This article adopts the following structure. Next, Section 2 develops a theoretical model that 
depicts to what extent firms use different types of external finance in the face of changes in monetary 
policy, taking into account their structural financial characteristics. Section 3 develops the 
methodology by which we estimate the magnitude of this impact for the period 1992-2000. Section 4 
presents the main empirical results, and Section 5 draws the main conclusions of the paper. 
   
2. An explanatory model. 
We develop below a theoretical model in which we analyse the extent to which firms employ 
different types of external finance -and varying their level of debt- in response to changes in monetary 
policy. The model takes into account the size, level of capitalisation, liquidity, and level of bank debt 
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of the firms. To undertake this, and starting with the model developed by Diamond (1991), we 
incorporate the market interest rate –as a measure of the opportunity cost borne by firms in obtaining 
finance – to analyse the implications of monetary policy for the mechanisms of transmission. We also 
include the role played by the different structural financial characteristics.  
 
Let us consider a firm i, whose assets (TA) in a period of time t, are given by the sum of the 
liquid or current assets (LIQ), and fixed assets or capital goods (INV). Both types of rights are financed 
through equity (CAP) and external resources (DEB). Additionally, we assume that the value of the 
tangible assets held by the firm that can be offered as collateral exceeds the level of debt (INV>DEB).  
 
Let us suppose that the firm decides to carry out a certain investment project which will 
generate a cash flow X with a probability pj (and 1-pj in the opposite case). The firm can choose to 
apply two different technologies ( j=1, 2 ), where p2X > p1X, i.e. the use of technology 2 provides a 
higher expected return. The managers - responsible for the firm’s decision making – will choose the 
investment project that maximises their expected utility (EU), which is given by a proportion α of the 
profits distributed to shareholders Π, plus the personal profits directly obtained by them, β, i.e.: 
 Max EU=αΠ+β.                                  (1)  
 
The private profit obtained by the managers is zero when the decision is made to use the 
“good” technology (technology 2), and B>0, when the firm opts to apply the “bad” technology 
(technology 1). We assume that B is proportional to the size of the firm (B=bAT) (Diamond, 1991). 
Finally, we establish the condition that (p2-p1)X>B, i.e. the application of the “good” technology is 
socially efficient.   
 
The investment project can be financed either by using the firm’s own resources, or by seeking 
external financing. In the second case, the firm can opt to formalise bank credits, or seek non-bank 
financing (issue of securities and business credit, among others). For simplicity, and given the aim of 
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our study, we assume that the firm chooses the second of the options indicated, requiring finance for 
an amount F.  D would be the quantity that the firm has to repay if the project is carried out 
successfully. In the event that the firm does not meet its financial obligations it has acquired, it will 
proceed to liquidate the debt by surrendering the assets offered as collateral. 
 
Let us suppose that, initially, the firm decides access to non-bank financing. In this case, the 
utility expected by the managers is given by: 
( ) ( )( )[ ] bTAINVTApDEBTADXpEU MG +−−+−+−α= 21 1                                           (2) 
if they choose for the “good” technology, and: 
 
( ) ( )( )[ ]INVTApDEBTADXpEU MB −−+−+−α= 12 1                                                 (3) 
if they use the “bad” technology. 
 
Since the managers must choose the socially efficient technology, in accordance with 
equations (2) and (3), it is true that:  
 ( )( ) bTADEBTADXpp ≥−+−−α 12                                                                                     (4) 
        
If r represents the opportunity cost incurred by the firm which corresponds to the official 
interest rate, the condition of maximisation of profits of the lender is given by:  
( )( ) ( )rFDEBINVpDEBp +=−−+ 11 22                                           (5) 
 
provided the firm incorporates the technology defined as “good”.    
 
The managers of the firm will have incentives to incorporate the “good” technology into the 
development of their investment project, if and only if, the following condition is satisfied 
(substituting (4) in (5)): 
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12 1                (6) 
 
Otherwise, the managers of the firm will opt to apply the “bad” technology, its expected utility 
being equal to: 
 ( )[ ] bTArFDEBTAXpEU MB ++−−+α= 1´ 1                    (7) 
and: 
 ( )( ) ( )rFDEBINVpDp +=−−+ 11 11                   (8) 
would be the condition of maximisation of the lender’s profits. 
 
 Banks present greater efficiency – compared to the markets- in matters relating to the control 
and monitoring of information on the development of investment projects. In this sense, the firm may 
consider that benefits from choosing bank credit, bearing a cost m per unit of finance obtained 
(Diamond, 1984). In this context, the managers of the firm will acquire the “good” technology when:  
 
















12 1                                           (9) 
 
The expected utility obtained by the managers being ( BGU ) and the condition of maximisation 
of profits by the bank will be given, respectively, by: 
( )( )[ ]rmFDEBTAXpU BG ++−−+α= 12                                                                              (10) 
( )( )DEBINVpLp −−+ 22 1                      (11) 
 
Consequently, the firm will opt for non-bank finance if condition (6) is met but not condition 
(9); in any other case, the investment project will be financed by bank credit. Combining the results 
obtained from the above expressions, we have: 
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i.e. for profitabilities lower than Q1, the firm will incorporate the “bad” technology, which will 
be financed by non-bank resources. This source of finance will be maintained when the expected 
profitability exceeds Q2, though in this case, the managers will opt to incorporate the “good” 
technology. When the expected unit yield of the investment is between Q1 and Q2, the firm will acquire 
the socially efficient technology by using bank credit. 
 
    Next, we will analyse the extent to which firms access the different types of finance in 
response to changes in monetary policy. We also study the role played by the size, the level of 
capitalisation, the liquidity and the bank gearing of the firm.2 We derive expression (12), (in terms of 
lower and upper limit) in relation to the characteristics indicated, obtaining the following results: 
 
a) Impact of monetary policy: 
Given that 
TA
DEBINV −  represents the net wealth of the firm, which we will designate by W, 
which is a decreasing function of the interest rate ( 0<∂
∂
r
W ), we have: 
                                                 





























Q                  (14) 
 
The results provided by equations (13) and (14) show that firms that increase the proportion  
of their non-bank finance relative to that from banking institutions, will present higher levels of 
profitability when monetary conditions become tougher. Taking into account that variations in interest 
rates affect Q1 and Q2, it is necessary to know exactly how they are distributed in order to quantify the 
impact of monetary policy decisions on the structure of external finance. However, on the basis of our 
earlier assumptions, it seems plausible to expect that when interest rates rise, firms whose profitability 
is below Q1 will replace non-bank finance by credit from financial institutions, while those whose unit 
profitability exceeds Q2 will increase their financing from non-bank sources.  
 
























Q            (16) 
 
Since profitability increases, ceteris paribus, with the volume of the firm’s assets, the use of 
bank loans will decrease, ceteris paribus, as assets augment.  
 
c) Impact of capitalisation: 
Changes in the probability of success of the investment project may be considered as 
variations in the distribution of the risk of the firm. Defining (p2-p1) by ρ and considering that the level 
of capitalisation of the firm (CAP) is a decreasing function of  ρ  ( ( )ρf , with ( )0´ <ρf ) (Sharpe, 
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The results obtained confirm that the greater solvency with which firms operates results in a 
reduction of bank funding.3 
 
d) Impact of liquidity: 




















Q                      (20) 
 
As equations (19) and (20) show, the increase in the stock of cash and similar liquid assets by 
the firm reduces the use of external finance.  
 
e) Impact of bank gearing: 
The proportion of bank credit relative to own resources (GEAR) will have a positive impact on 
the level of bank credit a firm  can obtain (Petersen and Rajan ,1994; Hoshi et al. 1993), i.e. 
( )GEARgINV = , with ( )0´ >GEARg ) 4. Since Q1  is not affected by this component we find that:  






Q                                          (21) 
 
                                                 
3 Given a uniform distribution, firms that show high profitability and/or an increased level of capitalisation may 
increasingly prefer bank credit. This will depend on the value adopted by Q2 , which will in turn depend on the 
assumptions established as to its distribution. 
4 Firms that establish long-term relationships with financial institutions enjoy benefits derived from better 
conditions of access to bank loans, lower loan interest rates and smaller volume of collateral required even when 
monetary conditions are tightened. 
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In this case, the advantages offered by bank credit may lead even the most profitable firms to 
replace market finance by bank loans in order to finance their investment projects. 
 
3. Empirical approximation and data. 
 3.1. Specification and definition of variables. 
The general equation to be estimated, a reduced form of the model developed above, is given 
by: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
3 3 3 3
1 0 0 0
3 3
0 0
nt n j j t j j jn t j n t j n t j
j j j j
j j t ntn t j n t j
j j
FINDEX FINDEX r ta CAP
LIQ GEAR d
α β χ δ φ
ϕ γ ε
−− − −
= = = =
− −
= =
∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆
+ ∆ + ∆ + +
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
       (22) 
 
where FINDEX is an indicator representing the structure of external finance, as well as the 
debt maintained by firms; r is the official interest rate; TA the size of the firm; CAP the level of 
capitalisation; LIQ the level of liquidity shown by firms; GEAR represents the level of bank gearing of 
the firm at each moment of time t; while ∆, d and ε, are identified with the difference operator, the 
vector of dummy time variables, and in terms of error, respectively. Finally, α symbolises the specific 
fixed effect of each firm i. This term captures the deterministic trend shown by d for the firms in the 
sample. 5  
  
Three indicators were used to represent the external financial structure (FINDEX). The first, 
CRED is defined as “Bank Credit / (Bank Credit + Trade Credit)”.  The lower this indicator is, the 
higher the use of the trade credit when the firm is subject to a reduced access to bank credit following 
a monetary contraction (Meltzer, 1960; Nilsen 2002). The second indicator is BANK, which defined as 
the quotient between bank credit and total debt. The lower this indicator is, the higher the use of the 
capital markets instruments when the firm faces a reduction in the credit granted by financial 
                                                 
5 With the aim of obtaining residuals from white noise, the number of lags incorporated is three. After carrying 
out the estimation with 1 to 6 lags, three lags minimised the residuals. Additionally, given that the variables are 
first-order integrated, as verified by the Augmented Dickey Fuller test (not shown), they are considered in first 
differences. This solves the problems derived from the possible existence of spurious correlation. 
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institutions, a rise in its cost or a demand for more collateral (Gertler and Gilchirst., 1994; Oliner and 
Rudebusch, 1995)6. Finally, the third indicator is DEB, defined as total debt as a proportion of total 
liabilities (Hubbard, 1998). The lower DEB is, the higher the use of equity as a response to a monetary 
contraction. 
 
The monetary policy interest rate used -in line with the generally accepted literature (Kashyap 
et al., 1994; Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996) - is the inter-bank interest rate on non-transferable three 
month deposits. 7 In this way, given the heavy dependence of Spanish firms on bank finance (Estrada 
and Vallés, 1998) -the cost of which is determined by the rate incurred by intermediaries in obtaining  
funds- the opportunity cost borne by firms in obtaining external finance is appropriately reflected. 8  
 
With regard to the bank lending channel, the firms that present a greater dependence on bank 
finance find that monetary policy decisions are reflected with greater intensity in the composition of 
their balance sheet. To analyse the distributive effects of this transmission mechanism it is necessary 
to take into account the role played by certain specific structural characteristics of firms that may 
exacerbate the problems of asymmetrical information, agency costs and moral risk.  
 
Even when size does not directly determine the possibilities of access to outside resources and 
their cost, this variable shows a high correlation with the factors determining risk and volatility in the 
returns to firms (Gertler and Gilchirst, 1994; Hubbard, 1998). Given the existence of problems of 
asymmetrical information, the size of the firm (TA) given by the logarithm of Total Assets, can be 
understood as a proxy of the degree of availability of information on the managerial capacity to the 
lenders as well as of potential business projects to be developed, and of the management’s degree of 
control over them (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Along with these, it also captures the possible presence 
                                                 
6 In practice, the access to capital markets is usually only possible for large firms. 
7 We did not use the interest rate set by the Central Bank, because of the change in the public body responsible 
for the application of monetary policy (from the Bank of Spain to the ECB) during our period of study. 
8 The interest rate charged on firms’ credit is determined, inter alia, by monetary policy conditions, by the 
market structure of the banking market, by the negotiating power of the firms, and by the existence of long-term 
contractual relationships between the lender and the borrower (Berger and Udell, 2002). 
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of problems of moral risk that arise from the emergence of barriers to control and monitoring of the 
investments, which are reflected in a higher external financial premium (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). 
 
Holding liquid assets above a certain threshold limits the possibilities of obtaining outside 
resources, as it decreases the possibilities of transforming the portfolio of assets, as well as the net 
value of the firm, and therefore of the collateral that can be offered (Morellec, 2001). On the other 
hand, it may occur that firms that operate with a substantial cushion of liquidity are in a better 
situation to grant finance to the other production units in the economy and to obtain it from them, 
especially in a context of lower interest rates (Kim et al. 1998). The effect of liquidity is controlled 
through the variable LIQ, defined as the quotient between cash and other highly liquid assets, and total 
assets. 
 
The financial structure of the firm is proxied by incorporating two additional variables, the 
level of capitalisation (CAP) defined as equity relative to total assets, and the proportion of bank credit 
to equity (GEAR). In relation to the first, the empirical evidence shows that firms will try to carry out 
their investment projects, relying as much as possible on their own resources, provided that they do 
not suffer problems of decapitalisation (Baccheta and Caminal, 2000). By including GEAR we capture 
the firm’s bank debt (strictly speaking), relative to the firm’s own resources (equity). Given the 
unavailability of alternative information, this variable also proxies the importance of firms’ contractual 
relations with their banks (Hoshi et al. 1993). 
 
3.2. Methodology and data. 
We employ dynamic panel data to estimate equation (22). Within this technique we used the 
GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), given its capacity to 
reduce the inaccuracies and biases of estimation -whatever the size of the sample- resulting from the 
inclusion of lags of the dependent variable. This estimator is based on the simultaneous estimation of 
two equations. The first one is the regression in differences of equation (22), while the second refers to 
its estimation in levels. By this method we obtain consistent and efficient estimations, provided that 
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the instruments employed are adequate, in the sense that the residual correlation properties of the 
model are considered (Hsiao, 1986). For this reason, the instruments used were, together with the 
dependent variable (2 to 5 lags), the vector of the rest of the explanatory variables (r, TA, CAP, LIQ 
and GEAR) with a structure of 1 to 5 lags. 
 
We employ microeconomic data from the pan-European Amadeus database, corresponding to 
15.617 Spanish firms for the period 1992-2000, giving a panel of 105.755 observations. 9,10,11 The data 
correspond to the consolidated statements of accounts, so as to capture the possible transfers of assets 
between firms that constitute a single business holding. Finally, the inter-bank interest rate on three 
month transferable deposits was taken from the Statistical the Bank of Spain.    
 
 In order to test the hypotheses derived from the theory of the bank lending channel, we have 
adopted a sequential scheme. In this sense, equation (22) is estimated at a first stage for all the firms of 
the sample. Subsequently, in order to show whether monetary policy measures generate distributive 
effects, firms are classified by size, level of capitalisation, and liquidity. In relation to the first of these 
criteria, the firms defined as large are those in the last quartile, while the “small” ones are those in the 
first quartile.12 The same criterion was applied to classify firms in terms of their level of capitalisation 
or liquidity.       
 
                                                 
9 We did not employ macroeconomic data since these  may give rise to biased results on the operativity of the 
transmission channels of monetary policy due to: 1) simultaneity problems; 2) frictions in the capital markets; 
and 3) heterogeneity among the firms in the sample (Chirinko et al., 1999). 
10 This data base contains information on, inter alia, the structure of the balance sheet, profit and loss account, 
number of employees, legal nature and industry classification. The lack of data presented by these variables on 
the age and credit rating of the firm prevents us incorporating them into the analysis.  
11 The periodicity of the data is annual, so we must bear in mind the potencial limitations on the analysis due to 
the impossibility of reflecting: 1) the immediate impact of variations in interest rates on the composition of 
external finance; and 2) the bias in the composition of the sample, as a consequence of the predominance of large 
firms. 
12 The distribution of firms among the different categories has been done for each individual period, in order to 
reflect the dynamic nature of the data. Consequently, each firm may appear in different classifications for each 
year, so the number of firms in the various categories need not remain constant throughout the period considered. 
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  Firms have also been classified according to the sector in which they carry out their activity13. 
The criterion of aggregation used was that defined by the CNAE93 statistical convention, considering 
subclasses of three digits14. Six categories were established: 
 
- Agriculture, livestock, fisheries, hunting and forestry. 
- Extractive industry, production and distribution of energy, electricity, gas and water. 
- Manufacturing industry. 
- Market services - shops, centres for the repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles, dedicated 
outlets for personal items for domestic use - transport, warehousing and communications. 
- Construction. 
- Education, health, social security and defence. 
 
  4. Empirical evidence. 
Equation (22) was estimated for the different categories of firms defined in the previous 
section. The regression analysis was carried out considering the three specifications of FINDEX as 
dependent variable. Since the objective of the paper is to analyse the degree to which non-financial 
firms respond similarly to, or differently from, financial institutions, we estimate the long-term 
coefficients (η), which are given by the sum of the short term coefficients of each of the independent 
variables, divided by one minus the sum of the short term coefficients of the dependent variable 
















                                                  (22) 
                                                 
13 This classification allows greater homogeneization of the influence of omitted but relevant variables. It also 
considers the different profiles of the investment (and of its financing) across economic sectors. 
14 This is the official classification by Eurostat and INE (Spanish Statistical Office). 
15 These coefficients represent the long-term percentage change in the indicator of the composition of external 
finance or debt, in response to a permanente variation of 1 % of any explanatory variables (i.e.interest rates, size, 
degree of capitalisation, liquidity, or bank gearing of the firm). 
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where Φ represents χ, δ, φ, ϕ, and γ, respectively. 16 
 
The values obtained by the Sargan test (see Table 1) confirm the validity of the instruments 
used. 17 On other hand, the values corresponding to the AR1 and AR2 tests indicate that there is no 
second order autocorrelation. We have also employed the Hubber-White procedure, in which the 
standard errors are calculated on the basis of the quasi-verisimilitude function. 
 
4.1. The impact of monetary policy measures. 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the impact of monetary policy actions. A unit increase in the 
inter-bank interest rate results in a reduction of .0129 in CRED (Bank Credit / (Bank Credit + Trade 
Credit)). This finding seems to confirm that in the presence of imperfections in the bank credit market, 
firms turn to trade credit to obtain the necessary resources for their business. This evidence is in line 
with the results obtained for the USA by Kashyap et al. (1994) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996). In 
terms of the various categories of firms identified, we observe significant differences. In relation to 
size, the coefficient associated with larger firms is slightly lower, in absolute value, than that 
corresponding to the smallest ones. The same occurs when firms are classified according to their level 
of liquidity. If we distinguish by sectors, we observe that firms of primary and construction activities 
make a larger use of trade credit when the supply of bank credit shrinks, while the impact on firms 
engaged in the extraction and distribution of natural resources is practically negligible. 
 
The findings are similar when we employ BANK (Bank Credit/Total Debt) as dependent 
variable. When the price of bank loan rises, larger firms make a more intensive use of non-bank 
finance, due to its lower cost. In this sense, a unit increase in interest rates has led, in the long run to a 
fall of .0196 of BANK. This impact is similar for the lowest-capitalised firms (.0129), but it is greater 
                                                 
16 We have not included the short term coefficients mainly because these coefficients have lower economic 
explanatory power and they are largely affected by strictly conjuctural factors. The exclusion of these results also 
simplifies the empirical evidence of the paper.     
17 The values obtained by incorporating a smaller number of instruments are characterised by the loss of 
significance of the long-term coefficients, as a consequence of the complex structural presented by the model 
(Chatelain et al., 2004). 
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for small firms (.03000). It is also greater for firms of the primary sector (.0214) and of manufacturing 
(.0214).  
 
Finally, rises in interest rates do not seem to have generated a substantial and significant 
reduction in DEB (Total Debt/Total Liabilities). The coefficient corresponding to r is -.0015 for the 
firms classified as of low liquidity. As for the most significant differences across economic sectors, the 
lowest values correspond to construction (-.0011), while the highest are those of market services firms 
(-.0240) and those dedicated to agriculture, livestock, fishing and forestry (.0222). 
 
4.2. The impact of specific financial structural characteristics. 
Table 3 summarizes the results for the impact of firm size on firms’ financial characteristics. 
In the case of CRED, the long-term coefficient of the variable TA is -.0001 for the largest firms, rising 
to -.0056 for their smaller counterparts. The regressions employing BANK and DEB as dependent 
variable find similar impacts of size. These results appear to support that size have not conferred any 
advantage to large firms to obtain capital market funding.  
 
A second factor influencing firms’ orientation towards bank credit has been the strength of 
their own capital. The availability of sufficient internal funds for the materialisation of investment 
projects reduces the use of external finance (Baccheta and Caminal, 2000). Our empirical evidence 
supports this argument. Table 4 exhibits that the coefficient corresponding to CAP is negative and 
significant, with the exception of that referring to the subsample of market services and construction 
firms. When the dependent variable considered is BANK, we observe that higher own capital has 
largely compensated the reduction of bank credit in the case of firms devoted to extraction, production 
and distribution of energy, electricity, gas and water, and manufacturing industry.  
 
Table 5 shows that in the long run, an increase of 1 % in the relative weight of liquid assets on 
the balance sheet has led to a reduction of CRED. The magnitude of this impact is 1.7503 for the firms 
with a higher proportion of liquid assets. This coefficient is 1.4883 for the smaller firms. If we 
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distinguish by sector, the role played by the cushion of liquidity has been greater for firms devoted to 
construction and market services. These results show a high correlation with those obtained when the 
dependent variable considered is BANK.   
 
Firms that show a high level of bank credit relative to equity do not suffer a reduction of the 
supply of bank loans in times of hardening of monetary conditions (Berger and Udell, 2002). Our 
findings in Table 6 (when we study the impact of GEAR) are in line with this argument. When we 
analyse the behaviour described by BANK, we observe that firms that enjoy higher levels of solvency 
have replaced bank credit with non-bank finance, even in the case of the existence of contractual 
relations with the banks. When we analyse the impact on DEB, the results suggest that the impact of 
GEAR has been greater for the highest- and lowest-capitalised firms.  If we distinguish by sector, this 
variable has played an important role in the firms of market services activities. 18 
 
4.3. Analysis of robustness. 
  With the aim of greater robustness for our analysis we employed alternative variables, and we 
included additional aspects that may determine firms’ financial behaviour in reaction to changes of 
orientation of monetary policy. 19 
 
First, we replaced the three month inter-bank interest rate by the deviation of the interest rate 
from the rate estimated through the reaction function of the Central Bank (obtained by application of 
the VAR methodology). The results confirm that firms tend to alter the composition of their debt when 
monetary conditions are tightened. The magnitude with which this occurs is slightly lower, around 1 
%, probably as a consequence of the underestimation of the exogenous component of the interest rate 
implied by the application of this methodology (Bernanke and Mihov, 1998). 
 
                                                 
18 We have undertaken mean differences tests for the long-term coefficients of the following subsamples:  largest 
versus smallest firms; highest-capitalisation versus lowest-capitalisation firms; firms with high liquidity vesus 
those with low liquidity; and each economic activity sector versus the total sample.  The results (not shown) 
indicate that the differences are, in general, statistically significant.  
19 The results are available on request from the authors. 
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Another test of robustness was to incorporate the cost of the debt in order to capture the 
possible influence of the relationship of the firm with the supplier of funding (i.e. how rates are set for 
the firm and how the rates are affected in a monetary contraction). The results indicate that in no case 
was it statistically significant. 
 
Subsequently, we proceeded to include the ratio between profits before taxes and interest paid, 
in order to quantify the restrictions set by firms’ profitability on firms’ financial decisions. According 
to our results show that it has not appeared to have been a significant factor. When this measure is 
replaced by cash flow (defined as cash receipts minus cash payments), the results do not vary 
significantly. In both cases, the long-term coefficient, even when it shows the expected sign, is not 
statistically significant. 
 
The inclusion of ROA (Return on Assets) or ROE (Return on Equity) does not show that 
profitability has significantly influenced the composition of the firms’ debt. Only ROA was 
statistically positive when the regression analysis was carried out for the total sample, and the 
dependent variable was BANK.    
 
Two other aspects considered were the structure of ownership and the form of company 
adopted. With respect to the first, the firms were classified as private and public, the latter being those 
that throughout the period of study presented (any kind of Central, Regional or Local) Government 
participation among their shareholders. Likewise, the variable was not statistically significant in any of 
the cases, which seems to confirm that the existence of differences in the arguments of the target 
function and the mechanisms for obtaining external resources have not determined the uneven degree 
of access to the various sources of finance. The same occurs when we introduce a qualitative variable 
that takes the value 1 when the firm is a PLC, 2 a limited company, 3 a cooperative and 4 for other 
other legal forms. In this way, the results suggest that the ownership regime has not determined the 
existence of differences in the access to bank credit as against other alternative sources. 
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Finally, we included the logarithm of GDP or the logarithm of firms’ sales to capture the 
possible impact of the economic cycle. Only in some cases was the long-term coefficient associated 
with these variables significant at 10 %. For example, it was significant for small firms and for firms 
with a low level of liquidity when the dependent variable is BANK.  
 
5. Conclusions. 
In terms of the theoretical foundations of the bank lending channel, financial institutions with 
larger size, higher capitalisation and higher liquidity present a greater capacity to maintain their levels 
of their credit investments in the face of a tightening of monetary conditions. There is a body of 
literature that offers empirical evidence for the hypothesis of the bank lending channel both in the US 
and Europe. However, there is little empirical evidence on this hypothesis applied to non-financial 
firms in Europe. 
 
This article has attempted to test to what extent the results (of the hypothesis of the bank lending 
channel) obtained for banks are maintained when the analysis is performed on non-financial firms. We 
have estimated –employing dynamic panel data-  the impact of monetary policy actions on the 
composition of the external finance and the liabilities for a sample of  Spanish firms during the period 
1992-2000. Other financial structural characteristics such as  size, capitalisation and liquidity -which 
may also affect the financial decisions of the firms- are also considered in the analysis. 
 
The results obtained indicate that firms of small size, together those with a lower level of liquidity 
and/or lower level of solvency, have been affected, to a larger extent, by rises in interest rates as a 
consequence of a monetary policy action. These results confirm the fulfilment of the hypotheses of the 
bank lending channel (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996), of the balance sheet channel (Kashyap, et al., 
1993; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994), and the favourable influence of long-term relationships of firms 
and banks (Hoshi et al., 1993). When monetary conditions are tightened, the largest firms together 
with those with higher capitalisation and/or higher liquidity make a larger use of non-bank funding 
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since they have easier access to capital markets.  However, smaller firms together with those with low 
capital and/or low liquidity maintain their financial dependence on banks in these tightened monetary 
conditions.. Consequently, this empirical evidence is in support of the hypothesis that non-financial 
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Table nº 1: Summary of regression analysis of the different models’ specifications. 
Dependent Variable: 





















Total Sample .212 .000 .289 15,617 82,667 .302 .000 .359 15,617 105,197 .160 .000 .276 15,617 105,729 
Large Firms .264 .000 .287 2,095 9,045 .292 .000 .327 2,095 9,813 .147 .000 .253 2,095 9,811 
Small Firms .275 .000 .290 3,496 7,471 .148 .000 .232 3,096 16,191 .288 .000 .291 3,096 16,379 
High Liquidity 
Firms 
.248 .000 .283 4,105 13,063 .222 .000 .248 4,105 16,320 .242 .000 .336 4,105 16,377 
Low Liquidity 
Firms 
















.201 .000 .380 303 1,656 .289 .000 .201 303 2,090 .230 .000 .232 303 2,095 
Manufacturing 
Industry 

























































.332 .000 .347 217 2,422 .299 .000 .332 217 3,178 .305 .000 .368 217 3,189 
Estimation by GMM-system estimator using the robust two step method. Sargan test is a test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported), distributed as chi-squared under null validity of 





Table nº2: The effect of monetary policy (r) on the external financial structure indicator. 
 Long-term coefficients. 
 Dependent variable: 
 CRED BANK DEB 






















































































































Table nº3: The effect of size (TA) on the external financial structure indicator. 
 Long-term coefficients. 
 Dependent variable: 
 CRED BANK DEB 


































































































Notes: ***/**/* denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 % levels. Asymptotic robust standard errors reported 






















Table nº4: The effect of capitalization level (CAP) on the external financial structure indicator. 
 Long-term coefficients. 
 Dependent variable: 
 CRED BANK DEB 


































































































Notes: ***/**/* denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 % levels. Asymptotic robust standard errors reported 























Table nº5: The effect of liquidity level (LIQ) on the external financial structure indicator. 
 Long-term coefficients. 
 Dependent variable: 
 CRED BANK DEB 


































































































Notes: ***/**/* denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 % levels. Asymptotic robust standard errors reported 






















Table nº6: The effect of firm´s gearing ratio (GEAR) on the external financial structure indicator. 
 Long-term coefficients. 
 Dependent variable: 
 CRED BANK DEB 


































































































Notes: ***/**/* denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 % levels. Asymptotic robust standard errors reported 
in parenthesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
